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From 1989 to 2003 kidney transplant waiting lists have grown 247%. The effect of this growth and advances in
kidney transplant technology has caused a shortage of available organs and the death of thousands waiting for
their transplant. Current procurement policy based on altruism has failed to increase the supply of kidneys,
yet many consumers and professionals are opposed to a market based system. This paper will examine the
current altruistic procurement policy as well as presumed consent and a hypothetical open market approach.
With the use of data from the United Network of Organ Sharing and the United States Renal Data System, I
will discuss the economic and moral dilemmas of the shortage and argue for a market based procurement
policy.
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Introduction 
 
 Technology in the Healthcare Industry is unique in that one must weight better-
quality outcomes and longer life against the costs of producing those results.  Kidney 
transplant and dialysis treatment have been introduced and developed over the last half 
century and have had large benefits and costs.  Specifically, the first successful kidney 
transplant was performed in 1954 between identical twins (Barney & Reynolds, 1989).  
Since then the development of immunosuppressive drugs have increased survival rates of 
transplant recipients and increased the number of individuals on waiting lists for 
transplant.  Unfortunately the increase in the demand for kidneys has not been met with 
an increase in supply, and today 65,226 people are waiting for a kidney transplant 
(OPTN, 2005).  This shortage of transplantable organs has lead to significant social costs 
that have not been corrected by the altruistic policy that guides organ procurement today. 
The current policy of altruism or volunteerism is the by-product of property rights 
established in the two guiding statutes on transplantation and organ procurement. The 
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) of 1968 enabled people to formally document 
their wish to donate their body or organs for transplantation and research after death.  
This act is “grounded in the idea that volunteerism would supply a sufficient amount of 
organs for transplant while promoting altruism and protecting patient self-determination” 
(Barney & Reynolds, 1989).  Soon after the draft of the UAGA, all fifty states passed 
versions of the law to be held and abided by in the procurement and transplant of organs.  
The second influential statue is the National Organ Transplantation Act (NOTA) passed 
by Congress in 1984.  Within this legislation, the buying or selling of human organs 
became illegal.  NOTA states: “It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, 
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receive or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in 
human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce.”  Interestingly, NOTA 
does allow compensation for blood donation and reasonable payments for obtaining and 
processing a donated organ such as travel, housing, and lost wages costs (Altinanahtar, 
Alper, B.A., M.A., May 2004).  NOTA also organized the current system of Organ 
Procurement Organizations into the Organ Procurement Transplant Network (OPTN) and 
placed the United Network for Organ Sharing as the regulatory body in the procurement 
and disbursement of organs. 
UAGA and NOTA further specify the policy that has been present since the first 
kidney transplant in 1954: organ donors are unable to receive compensation for donation.  
The purely altruistic approach to organ procurement and the developments in medical 
technology have increased the shortage of donable organs drastically.  In this paper I will 
observe the developments in technology that have made kidney transplant the more 
attractive treatment for End Stage Renal Disease (ESRD).  I will discuss the costs 
associated with transplant and dialysis and the reasons for their substitutability.  Three 
policies will be examined; the current altruistic/required request policy, presumed 
consent, and a hypothetical open market approach.  The ethical implications of each 
policy will be discussed, and I will propose that a market solution will both correct the 
shortage and reduce costs. 
This paper will rely heavily on microeconomic theory and health economic theory 
in its discussion of open market policy and the substitution of transplant and dialysis.  
This reliance is necessary because open market operations have never been implemented, 
thus no empirical data exists to study its effects. In addition, the amount of data that is 
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available for kidney transplants/costs and dialysis treatments/costs free of charge is 
inadequate.  Still, the arguments made and the statistical data should not be unrecognized 
or seen as useless.  The issue of the organ shortage is a large medical, economic, and 
ethical problem. The assumptions behind open market operations and substitution 
clustered with medical market observations will serve as a foundation for working toward 
correcting the shortage of kidney organs. 
 
I. Dialysis, Transplant, and Substitution 
 
 Before discussing the theoretical assumptions of substitution in the medical 
market, I would like to elaborate on ESRD and the various treatments that are available 
for patients suffering from this disease.  ESRD occurs when the kidneys fail, thus 
creating a creatinine buildup because the body is unable to filter and excrete it properly.  
Individuals with ESRD have three treatment options available to them; Hemodialysis, 
Peritoneal Dialysis, or Transplant (Bryant, 2005). 
 Hemodialysis is not a synthetic kidney, but it performs the blood filtering function 
of a healthy kidney.  A patient undergoing hemodialysis must be hooked up to a machine 
three times a week for periods of three to four hours per treatment.  The machine acts as a 
filter passing urine, while retaining suspended proteins.  This treatment requires a 
surgical procedure where a fistula is created to accommodate the sixteen gauge needle 
that must be directly inserted into the patient’s vein (Bryant, 2005). 
 Peritoneal Dialysis (CAPD or CCPD) is a less evasive treatment which requires 
no medical assistance and can be performed at home.  This treatment works inside the 
body using the peritoneal membrane to retain a reservoir of dialysis solution which is 
exchanged via catheter every four to six hours.  It is important to recognize that 
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peritoneal dialysis does have an increased probability of infection and is more machine-
dependant, but it does allow the patient daytime freedom because the treatment can be 
administered during sleep due to an automated cycler (Bryant, 2005). 
 The third and final option for ESRD patients is transplant.  With the introduction 
of immunosuppressive drugs, which fight the body’s instinct to destroy foreign objects 
such as the new kidney, transplant survival rates have increased substantially.  Patients 
must be on these immunosuppressive drugs for the duration of their post-transplant life 
and initial costs for transplant are quite high.  The main problem with transplant is the 
shortage of available organs; the patient may never get the organ that he or she needs so 
desperately (Bryant, 2005). 
  
A. Why are Transplants and Dialysis Substitutes 
 
Economists assume that when consumers make choices, such as choosing dialysis 
or transplant, they act rationally.  This is to say that consumers are risk adverse, price 
minimizing, and benefit maximizing beings.  Along with this logic, consumers are 
assumed to choose a good or service as long as the good or service’s marginal benefit is 
greater than or equal to its marginal cost.   
Certain constraints must be placed on this behavior.  The rational choice model 
considers a world with two goods and measures the amount of goods that a person will 
consume in bundles or a particular combination of the two specified goods.  The bundles 
available to the consumer are constrained by that consumer’s income in the form of a 
budget line, which is the set of all bundles that exactly exhaust the consumer’s income.  
Indifference curves are then used to identify when a consumer is indifferent to a set of 
bundles.  The indifference curve that lies above the budget constraint is preferred to those 
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that are on the budget constraint and the indifference curve on the budget constraint is 
preferred to those under it.  With the use of budget constraints and indifference curves, a 
consumer’s utility choices can be derived (Frank, 2003). 
This microeconomic model is transferable to health economics and patient 
decisions.  In the medical industry, patients are deciding between different treatments that 
give themselves the best health outcome within a certain income range.  However, the 
presence of third-party-payers gives the patient an extremely large “income” and the 
price of treatment becomes less likely to affect decisions of treatments (Henderson, 
2002).  The influence of third-party-payers in ESRD began with the 1979 amendment to 
the Social Security Act which allowed the federal government to pay for 80 percent of 
treatment costs (both dialysis and transplant) for kidney disease (Blair & Kaserman, 
1991).  Private insurance has also increased its coverage in transplant costs, which has 
further clouded the consumer’s sensitivity to price.  The presence of third-party-payers 
lowers the out-of-pocket costs for the consumer.  When you are not paying the bills, there 
is little incentive to reduce demand or act rationally when considering the price of 
transplant and dialysis (Henderson, 2002). The impact of third-party-payers will have a 
direct impact on the analysis of the rational choice theory for dialysis and transplant. 
Finally, in the medical care industry, treatments that lead to the same outcome are 
considered substitutes.  As described above, the influence of third-party-payers makes 
consumers extremely insensitive to price and makes demand for medical treatments 
extremely price inelastic.  Appropriately, the high costs of dialysis treatment and kidney 
transplant are infinitesimal when considering the possible health advantages to these 
treatments.  Patients will focus more on the time involved to administer dialysis treatment 
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or the physical strain from kidney surgery and weigh the health benefits with these costs 
rather than monetary expenses. 
 
B. Empirical Analysis and Findings 
 
When using the rational choice model in considering dialysis and transplant there 
must be a few modifications.  First, the consumer cannot use both treatments or consume 
a half of a transplant.  They must consume X dialysis treatments (dialysis is an on going 
procedure) or one transplant.  This will lead the analysis to a corner solution, or when the 
consumer does not consume one of the goods.  Second, because of third-party-payments 
from Medicare and private insurance the cost of each treatment will not largely decide 
which treatment a patient chooses.  Therefore, patients will migrate to the treatment that 
offers the best outcomes.  I argue that, because of the medical advances in kidney 
transplant such as the immunosuppressive drug cyclosporine in 1979, along with newer 
drugs, Prograft and Cellcept, and the costs of dialysis apparent in the hours wasted each 
week connected to a dialysis machine, the majority of ESRD patients would prefer 
transplant (Bryant, 2005).  Finally, utility and demand for dialysis treatment is overstated.  
Patients are pushed into receiving dialysis because there is a shortage of transplantable 
kidneys; because of this, dialysis treatment can be considered an imperfect substitute 
because the results do not have the same quality.  As I argued above, the majority of 
patients want transplant except for those who feel they could not undergo the trauma of 
surgery. However, this majority is moved to a lower indifference curve and receives less 
utility because they must be treated with dialysis. 
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Figure 1.1 
 
Dialysis 
I0 
I1
Transplant 
Figure 1.1 illustrates the argument in graphical form.  Notice that each indifference curve, 
I0 and I1, leads to a corner solution because the patients can only consume dialysis or 
transplant, not both.  Patients want to be on the indifference curve I0 because they believe 
transplant has the most health and lifestyle benefits.  However, the majority of these 
patients who demand transplant are moved to indifference curve I1 because of the 
shortage of organs available for transplant.  I1 is less preferable to these people because it 
is below I0, where their utility is maximized. 
To study the shortage of kidneys and the substitution effects of dialysis treatment, 
I turned to the United Network of Organ Sharing (UNOS) and the United States Renal 
Data System (USRDS).  These groups provide transplant and renal data free of charge to 
the public for educational and research purposes.  Although I found sufficient data for my 
undergraduate research and argument of substitution and the resulting shortage, I must 
rely heavily on the theory behind the numbers.  There is no such thing as a free lunch; 
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thus, the data set from UNOS and USRDS is smaller than a data set from a subscription 
based supplier.  More importantly, although the data set is diminutive, the results convey 
the theory on which I rely. 
My sample for analysis stretched from 1996 to 2002 for transplant “patient years 
at risk,” and dialysis Medicare payments per “patient years at risk.”  To determine the 
substitution of kidney transplant for dialysis treatment, I named transplant my dependent 
variable with dialysis and time as my independent variables.  I then performed a 
regression of these three variable’s natural logs to determine the cross-price-elasticity of 
transplant and dialysis.  Cross-price-elasticity is the percentage change in the quantity 
demanded of one good caused by a one percent change in the price of the other.  The 
results of this ratio if below zero are compliments, and if above zero are substitutes. 
The following are my results: 
 
Regression output     confidence interval 
variables 
 
coefficients 
std. 
error    t (df=4) p-value 
95% 
lower 
95% 
upper 
intercept -87.3694 5.0388  -17.339 .0001 -101.3593  -73.3796 
LN of Dialysis Pmts 0.0873 0.0825  1.059 .3495 -0.1417  0.3164 
Time in years 0.0486 0.0028  17.598 .0001 0.0410  0.0563 
Data Source: (USRDS, 2005) 
 
Though my sample was relatively small, only covering seven years, the results can be 
explained by the budget constraint and indifference curve model that I presented above.  
With a 10% increase in the price of dialysis there will be an increase in quantity 
demanded for transplants of 8.73%.  As apparent by the t-statistic, less than the absolute 
value of two and a p-value stating a 34.95% chance that the results occur because of 
random chance this coefficient suggests an increase in the price of dialysis treatment 
would not be reason for increased demand for transplantation.  This result does not come 
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as a surprise when considering third-party-payers.  The out-of-pocket payment for the 
patients would increase by very little relative to the increase in the total price of the 
treatment.  Therefore, an increase in the price of either treatment will not have a large 
effect on the demand of the substitute good.  Also, in figure 1.1, I argued that most ESRD 
patients would prefer transplantation, thus wanting to be on indifference curve I0, but the 
shortage of organs moves the patients to indifference curve I1, consuming dialysis.  
Consequently, no matter what the cost of dialysis, the majority of ESRD patients will 
have to consume dialysis.  This explains the poor significance of a rise in the price of 
dialysis affecting the quantity of transplants demanded. 
  
II. The Shortage 
 
A shortage occurs when the price of the good is set below the equilibrium level.  
Thus, shortages occur when a price ceiling, the most a good can be sold for, is set below 
the equilibrium price and quantity.  When looking at the transplant market, we can assert 
that the zero price for kidneys, which must be maintained by transplant centers, is a price 
ceiling.  Under the current policy, procurement organizations have been unable to supply 
the number of organs that are needed for those wanting kidney transplants.  This 
relationship is shown in figure 1.2 where D0 is the demand for kidney transplants and S is 
the supply for transplant.  Notice that the demand curve is fairly steep, indicating that 
consumption is inelastic because of third-party-payers.  Also notice that the supply is 
fixed at Q0S because the price of kidneys is zero and selling above that price is illegal.  
With the price set at zero, a shortage is created shown by Q0D – Q0S, noted by the bold 
line. 
Figure 1.2 
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This shortage will persist as long as there is a price ceiling on the price of kidneys.  Later 
in this paper I will show how this shortage will be decreased and potentially eliminated 
by the institution of an open market. 
  
A. The Size of the Shortage 
 
The present shortage of kidneys is the result of the zero price that is placed on 
them.  Since 1989 there has been an enormous increase of 247% in the number of 
patients on the waiting list and a small increase of 74% in the number of organs supplied 
by living and dead donors.  However, when looking at this problem, the actual number of 
kidneys demanded is compressed because many doctors will not allow patients who want 
a kidney to be on the waiting list because they do not meet certain medical criterion to be 
a candidate for transplant, though they would be a candidate if there was a large enough 
supply of organs.  Graphically the shortage of kidneys is represented by: 
Figure 1.3 
D0 
S
Q0S Q0D
Price 
Quantity 
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The Shortage of Kidneys
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This graph shows the upward trend of the waiting list and the meager incline of 
transplants performed.  But why is the gap widening? 
 
B. Why is it increasing 
 
As seen by the waiting list data presented in the previous section the shortage of 
kidneys is increasing at alarming rates, 247% since 1989 (UNOS, 2005).  The reason for 
this shortage is explained by three phenomena.   
 The first is a growth in technology.  Medicine is always changing because of 
advances in drugs and procedures, thus causing a problem of higher costs for the same 
treatment but better results.  Kidney transplant has evolved since its birth in the middle of 
the twentieth century beginning with transplantation only being possible between patients 
who were genetically related.  At that time, rejection of the organ was extremely likely, 
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so patients had to bring in potential living donors to the hospital with them for the 
operation.  If the patient could not find a suitable donor, there would be no operations, 
hence, no shortage (Altinanahtar, Alper, B.A., M.A., May 2004).  With the introduction 
of the immunosuppressive drugs, cyclosporine in 1979 and new drugs Prograft and 
Cellcept, rejection rates decreased drastically and survival rates increased, making 
transplant the procedure of choice for ESRD patients (Bryant, 2005) 
 The increase in third-party-payments has also increased the shortage of kidneys.  
With the amendment of Medicare in 1979 increasing Medicare payments for kidney 
disease and private insurance shifting transplant from an experimental coverage 
procedure to a regular procedure, the financial burden of transplantation became less of 
an issue for ESRD patients when deciding between dialysis and transplantation.  Since 
the high initial cost of transplant was cut down by private insurance and Medicare 
payments, patients have moved toward transplant as the preferred treatment which has 
increased the demand for transplant and increased the shortage. 
 Finally, the shortage has increased because of the failure of the current 
procurement system.  The amount of cadaver organs has increased only slightly since 
1986 with living donors showing the same results (Blair & Kaserman, 1991).  This low 
rate of growth is due to a paradox which has been written about at length.  The number of 
deaths from car accidents, which yields the most suitable donor suppliers, has decreased 
with the increased usage of helmets and seatbelts.  Campaigns against drunk driving have 
also reduced the number of car accidents along with decreasing the amount of donor-
eligible subjects (Annas, June 1988).  Though the number of organs harvested is not 
increasing at levels that are needed, the decrease in traffic accident deaths is a great 
14
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accomplishment and should be looked at as a positive.  To counteract this stagnation of 
cadaver and living organ donation, the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 increased 
federal funding for the procurement of organs, but various educational campaigns have 
failed to reduce the gap between supply and demand significantly. 
 
C. The effects of the Shortage 
 
The rapid increase in the demand for kidneys juxtaposed with the slow increase in 
the supply for kidneys has caused large social costs on the United States.  The failure of 
instituting the proper policy to procure organs has caused monetary and non-monetary 
costs. 
The most obvious of these costs is loss of life.  Each year a multitude of patients 
die from kidney failure.  The Organ Procurement and Transplant Network documents the 
number of patients on waiting lists removed because of death, below is death removal 
data from 1995-2004: 
All Region Death Removals from Waiting Lists 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
3,723 4,247 4,811 5,505 6,971 6,639 7,195 7,257 7,008 6,727 
Source: www.optn.org
 
The above numbers should be considered relative estimates because they do not include 
the large number of patients that are unable to be placed on kidney waiting lists.  These 
patients include those that do not meet the specifications that nephrologists must use to 
decide who is most in need or would most benefit from a transplant.  With this in mind, 
the costs of life are not only those that are on waiting lists for donation but those that are 
unable to be placed on waiting lists because they are inadequate candidates for the 
“precious” and “scarce” kidney. 
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 Less obvious costs are those associated with dialysis treatment.    Since many 
patients with ESRD are unable to receive a transplant they must consume dialysis, 
making dialysis more of an imperfect substitute than a treatment that yields the same 
results as transplant.  Dialysis costs are apparent in the time needed to be hooked up to 
the machine, which occurs for three hours per treatment about three to four times per 
week (Bryant, 2005).  If transplant was available to these patients, the time lost while 
undergoing dialysis could be filled with more productive activities benefiting the 
individual and society.  Finally, patients must undergo surgery to accommodate the 
sixteen gauge needle which must be directly inserted into a vascular artery for treatment.  
During each treatment the skin covering this fistula must be broken, which provides 
further discomfort. 
 Monetary costs are also apparent because of the shortage of kidneys.  Paul Eggers 
has compared the costs of dialysis treatment to transplant treatment in multiple studies.  
Each time he has found that transplant is less costly relative to dialysis over time.  
Dialysis costs remain stable over the time of treatment, while transplant has a very high 
initial cost but lower maintenance costs, assuming there are no complications to the 
procedure (Eggers, 1992).  His study further supported the belief that transplant was less 
costly than dialysis treatment over time.  The high initial cost of transplant was recovered 
in about 4 ½ years with a ten year savings of $42,000 (Eggers, 1992).  The shortage of 
organs prevents the United States Medicare system from collecting the savings that it 
could if less dialysis was used and more organs were available to ESRD patients. 
 Lastly, a black market for kidneys has developed because of this shortage.  If 
patients waiting for kidneys in the United States cannot get them, they can go abroad and 
16
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buy a kidney from individuals that are willing to sell them.  Individuals in countries such 
as the United States, Canada, Italy, Australia, Japan, and Saudi Arabia have been found 
buying kidneys from people in poorer countries such as Romania, Philippines, Peru, 
India, and China (Scheper-Hughes, 2005).  Buyers are willing to pay a large range of 
prices for their kidney, from $750 to $30,000.  With the institution of an open market for 
cadaver organs, this black market for living donors would potentially decrease. 
 The shortage of kidneys is causing loss of life, large Medicare payments, 
productivity and quality of care deficiencies, and a black market for kidneys.  As waiting 
lists grow and more patients are diagnosed with ESRD these costs will escalate.  
Knowing this we must look at the current procurement systems efforts and effects on the 
supply of donable organs. 
 
III. Required Request and the Current Procurement System 
 
The current procurement system is based on a volunteerism and altruistic 
framework.  In the 1970s and 1980s deaths from the shortage of kidneys were on the rise, 
and there was a need to implement a policy that would help the procurement of organs.  
The answer was required request.  This policy required physicians or nurses to request for 
donation from the family members or guardians at the time of death (Caplan & Welvang, 
February 1989).  This policy kept the altruistic ideology of autonomy and giving, while 
increasing the amount of organs that were available to transplant. 
 
A. Is required request working? 
Economic researchers have studied required request from the day it was 
implemented.  Education has been the most important part of required request.  United 
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States policy makers have two central assumptions which govern organ donation.  First, 
physicians and nurses fail to ask families to donate, and secondly, families donate if 
asked (Siminoff, Laura A., PhD, Arnold, Robert M., MD, Caplan, Arthur L., PhD, 
Virnig, Beth A., PhD, & Seltzer, Deborah L., BA, July 1995).  These assumptions have 
been challenged with a study performed by Siminoff, Arnold, Caplan, Virnig, and Seltzer 
which examines why required request has not increased organ procurement. 
 Their study found that 83% of healthcare professionals correctly identify donable 
organs, and families of donor-eligible patients were approached about donation 73% of 
the time (Siminoff, Laura A., PhD et al., July 1995).  From these findings, the assumption 
that physicians and nurses do not approach donor eligible patients seems to be 
misleading.  More interestingly, Siminoff and her colleagues found that, of the families 
that were approached for organ donation, only 46.5% agreed to donate.  This too goes 
against the assumption that if families are asked they will agree to donate (Siminoff, 
Laura A., PhD et al., July 1995). 
 Many of the reasons families fail to consent are unclear.  With 95% of Americans 
stating that they are aware of transplant and about 75% wanting to donate an organ after 
their death, the low percentage of families willing to allow donation comes as a surprise.  
Research has been mixed regarding the “donation experience.”  Some families find the 
approachment process to be comfortable, while others believe it to be a very real 
affirmation of the death of their loved one (Siminoff, Laura A., PhD et al., July 1995).  
This is evidence that the altruistic ideal is not at fault, but rather the approachment 
process.  It still is not known when the best time to confront families about donation.  
However, it is clear that a family’s knowledge of a patient’s wishes to donate before their 
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death is central to the procurement of organs (Siminoff, Laura A., PhD et al., July 1995).  
Education seems to be the answer to these difficulties and continues to be the platform 
which procurement organizations use to increase the likelihood of donation. 
 Another study by Virnig and Caplan also examined the poor performance of 
required request procurement efforts.  This study also found that required request support 
was very high among medical professionals and their request efforts were just as robust; 
however, the refusal rates were extremely large.  Though the study found that required 
request did not have much of an impact on procurement, it did find that the effects of this 
law helped hospitals become more effective in identifying donor-eligible patients (Virnig 
& Caplan, October 1992).  Considering these results, required request has not failed 
entirely.  Though organ increases have not been evident, required request has forced 
hospitals to become efficient in identifying and approaching potential donors. 
 
IV. Alternative Solutions 
The increased efficiency of hospitals to identify donable organs, although a step 
in the right direction, has not increased the number of organs obtained by any significant 
measure.  Many authors have pondered how to influence the current system to increase 
donation, and all authors point toward the conclusions found by Siminoff--education of 
transplantation is vital.  Though education of treatments must always be used to make 
people aware of the “gift of life” they could give to an ERSD patient, the most promising 
policy alternatives are found in presumed consent and an open market.  Presumed consent 
is used widely in Europe, while an open market for organs has never been implemented.  
The open market policy will be discussed more thoroughly than presumed consent but a 
basic understanding of both is necessary. 
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A. Presumed Consent 
Presumed consent is an organ procurement policy which defines all individuals as 
donors unless they clearly indicate that they do not wish to donate during their lifetime 
(Phillips, 2003).  Many European countries including Spain, Belgium, and the Czech 
Republic, which procure more organs than the United States, use presumed consent.  
Though presumed consent policy has had great procurement effects in some countries, 
such as those listed above, other countries that use presumed consent for procurement 
have experienced less robust results.  When considering this, it would be false to attribute 
the increases in organ procurement entirely to the presumed consent without considering 
the importance of the hospital’s policies for procuring organs (Altinanahtar, Alper, B.A., 
M.A., May 2004).  
Far more important when discussing policies are the constraints placed on basic 
human rights.  Presumed consent is a policy that allows the government to “own” ones 
body as a “sack of spare parts” (Phillips, 2003).  This policy undermines individual 
preference and autonomy and places the ownership of ones body into the hands of the 
hospital or government, unless the donor specified before death that he or she wished not 
to donate.  Blair and Kaserman argue that though presumed consent may yield more 
organs, it does so in a way that takes advantage of the general public by using their 
reluctance to dissent and their ignorance or temporary confusion as a means to procure 
organs (Blair & Kaserman, 1991). 
There is also little public backing for presumed consent.  Surveys given out by 
Adams, Barnett, and Kaserman indicate that of the 391 respondents, 66% would be 
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offended if governmental policy would allow their organs to be removed without the 
donor’s consent. 
 
B. Open Market 
Instituting an open market in the existence of a shortage or excess demand is an 
extremely common policy in the United States.  This classical approach to disequilibrium 
has lasted through centuries as one that decreases shortages and provides a more efficient 
use of resources.  Establishing a market for kidneys involves much more than simply 
allowing kidneys to be bought and sold because it is an extremely complicated market 
which combines questions of efficiency and quality with real ethical dilemmas. Adams, 
Barnett, Blair, Beard, and Kaserman have written extensively about open markets for 
kidneys and have promoted their findings since the early nineties.  Their results and ideas 
will be used in creating and explaining the open market argument presented below. 
There are extreme ethical conflicts with the institution of a living donor open 
market; thus, I am arguing for a market for only those that are deceased.  Many different 
market solutions exist; however, Blair and Kaserman assume the following 
circumstances, which I will also defend: the potential donor will be paid a fixed amount 
of money, in the form of cash or tax credit, for entering into a binding contract which 
allows the removal of one or more organs after death (Blair & Kaserman, 1991).  Under 
this assumption it is important to understand that the shortage of kidneys does not come 
from a lack of deaths which yield transplantable organs but of the current systems ability 
to only collect 15-20% of the existing supply of cadaver organs (Adams, Barnett, & 
Kaserman, 1999). 
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The current procurement system is preferred by some economists for two 
economic criticisms.  First, individuals may be willing to donate at a zero price, however, 
when the altruistic policy is replaced by one that pays a price above zero, these donors 
may not donate at all because the self-giving component of the policy is gone.  Second, 
since a market has never been implemented in organs, the reaction of potential donors to 
a small price increase is not known.  The question here is will the supply curve be elastic 
or inelastic?  Adams, Barnett and Kaserman developed a model which presents three 
possible situations that could arise with the institution of a monetary incentive.  Figure 
1.4 graphically illustrates these situations. 
 
 
Figure 1.4 
 
Source: (Adams et al., 1999) 
 
Under the current policy the quantity of kidneys supplied is Q0S at a zero price.  The 
shortage is apparent when subtracting Q0D from Q0S.  This was discussed earlier in the 
D0 
S
Q0S Q0D
Price 
Quantity of 
kidneys
S’’ 
S’
Q3e
P3e
P2e
P1e
Q2e Q1e
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paper.  The supply curve S models a market where there is no negative response (those 
who were willing to donate at zero price but will not at a price above zero) and is 
relatively price elastic.  The shortage is substantially lowered from Q0D - Q0S to Q0D - Q1e.  
Supply curve S’ illustrates a slight negative effect in which potential suppliers are 
offended by the sale of organs and withdrawal from the market.  With a slightly higher 
price and lower quantity than supply curve S, the shortage is only decreased from Q0D - 
Q0S to Q0D – Q2e.  Finally, supply curve S’’ demonstrates a large negative shift and little 
responsiveness to price change.  In this scenario the supply of kidneys is actually lower 
than the supply when a purely altruistic policy is used! 
 The importance of knowing which of the above situations bests fits the supply of 
kidneys is essential to implementing an open market policy.  If supply curves S or S’ 
embody the true supply curve for kidneys than open market policy is far more beneficial 
than the current system.  However, if the kidney supply curves has more in common with 
S’’, then open market policy would decrease the benefits of the current altruistic policy 
and be a poor choice to correct the shortage of kidneys. 
 To answer this question Adams, Barnett, and Kaserman surveyed 391 students in 
eight different courses at the University of Auburn.  This study was the first empirical 
study on organ sale of its kind and its findings supported the widespread theoretical belief 
that an open market for organs would supply a sufficient amount of kidneys to alleviate 
the shortage.  Most importantly, their findings illustrated that the supply curve for 
kidneys would have only a small negative impact of donors leaving the market because 
they were offended.  The survey indicated that 96% of the sample were not offended by 
organ sales or were willing to donate despite being offended by the idea of the open 
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market, thus only a 4% supply intercept shift would occur (Adams et al., 1999) The 
survey also provided an estimate of prices the surveyed students would be willing to 
accept for donating after death.  Below are the price findings. 
Supply Schedule for Organ 
Donors  
Price Number of donors 
Increase in 
donors 
$0 138  
$10 149 11 
$250 165 27 
$50 183 45 
$100 221 83 
$500 249 111 
$1,000 299 161 
$5,000 311 173 
Over $5000 338 200 
Source: (Adams et al., 1999) 
The large increase in the number of donors willing to donate with a price of just $1,000 
suggests that kidney suppliers would be price sensitive, thus a semi-flat supply curve.  
With these two empirical findings, Adams, Barnett, and Kaserman believe that the supply 
of kidneys would look like S’ in figure 1.4. 
 
V. Ethical Concerns 
The open market solution to the shortage of transplantable kidneys is one that has 
been viewed by the American Medical Association and the American Hospital 
Association as policy that is unethical and inappropriate for organ procurement.  Yet the 
current policy, as seen above, has failed to yield sufficient organs, so why has this policy 
of altruism persisted?  The answer to this question is based on the ethical arguments of: 
Coercion of the Poor, Transplant Accessibility for the Poor, and Premature Termination 
of Care. 
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A.  Coercion of the Poor 
The first argument against an open market for organs is the coercion of the poor 
into donation.  This ethical argument is based on the poor being enticed by the economic 
incentive of donation that would help their current position in life but may supersede 
various religious or moral convictions (Blair & Kaserman, 1991).  The validity of this 
argument in the above policy solution is quite flawed.  Coercion of the poor assumes that 
the price of the kidney would be high enough to make the poor act in such a manner.  If 
the price of the organ is kept low, which has been argued in the previous section, the poor 
would not be inclined to donate because they hold their moral beliefs at a higher value.   
One must also observe the current procurement system in which families of 
patients are pushed, or coaxed into giving their kin’s kidney away free of charge.  These 
procedures are extremely coercive to those who are donating their organs.  Also, since the 
current policy cannot procure a sufficient amount of organs the poor from third world 
countries are selling their organs to first world buyers because of the economic gains they 
can achieve from such a transaction.  Thus, coercion of the poor is occurring with the 
current policy. With an increase in the number of organs obtained from an open market 
policy, the number of the third world poor donating would decrease because the demand 
for overseas organs would decline.  Finally, those who argue for the altruistic policies 
must take responsibility for the high social costs that occur to avoid this coercion. 
 
B. Transplant Accessibility for the Poor 
The second ethical concern is transplant accessibility for the poor, which states 
that only the wealthy will be able to afford transplant (Blair & Kaserman, 1991).  Once 
again this argument assumes that the price for kidneys would be very high, Adam’s, 
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Barnett’s, and Kaserman’s results deter.  Also, in speaking with multiple doctors, it was 
revealed that the poor are the people that are most likely to suffer from End Stage Renal 
Disease because they lack the resources to provide themselves with adequate healthcare 
and nutrition.  With this in mind, an increase in the number of organs procured would 
benefit the poor more than any other group.  Not only would the poor waiting for their 
kidney have a better chance of transplant but those that did not make it on the waiting list 
would be able to receive transplant because of the increase in supply of organs. 
Finally, accessibility concerns do not take into consideration third-party-payers.  
As mentioned, the amendment to social security in 1972 allows payment of 80% by the 
federal government for kidney disease.  When considering the cost of a kidney to be 
$1000, the patient would only be paying $200.  The increase in price of $200 is quite 
insignificant in terms of the full cost of a transplant and the benefits to life received by 
transplant. 
 
C. Premature Termination of Care 
The last ethical concern deals with the doctor impeding care though the patient 
could benefit from sustained treatment (Blair & Kaserman, 1991).  Once again this 
argument assumes that the price of a kidney would be high enough to entice family 
members or doctors to withdrawal care.  In addition, it assumes that the doctor would 
somehow gain from the procurement of their patient’s organ, which is not the case.  
Under the open market policy the property rights of the organs would belong to the party 
that entered into the contract with the donor, including the family or procurement firms.  
This contract certifies that the practicing physician has no incentive to remove care from 
the patient. 
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VI. Conclusion 
The topic of open market operations to diminish the shortage of transplantable 
organs is a very emotionally charged topic that must be addressed.  In this paper I have 
discussed the treatments and medical history of End Stage Renal Disease and shown the 
substitutability of dialysis treatment and kidney transplant.  Because of medical advances, 
most importantly immunosuppressive drugs, coupled with the time consuming costs of 
dialysis treatment, transplant has become the consumer’s preferable choice when treating 
ESRD.  Though patients demand transplants technological advances, third-party-payers 
and the current procurement policy have created an extremely large shortage of 
transplantable organs, which forces patients to consume dialysis. 
This shortage has created significant social costs.  Patients taken off transplant 
waiting lists because of death have numbered over 6,000 for the past five consecutive 
years.  Medicare payments are far larger than they would be if enough organs were 
available for transplant.  Dialysis treatment renders its patients less productive than they 
could be as a result of the hours they must be hooked up to a machine every week.  
Finally, an overseas black market has developed for kidneys in which citizens of the 
United States and other first world countries have bought organs for transplant.   
These four costs could be diminished with the institution of an open market for 
cadaver organs.  Adams, Barnett, and Kaserman have helped further the debate for open 
markets in the procurement of kidneys showing that the price of kidneys would be 
relatively low, thus making it worthwhile to implement.  However, in the real world will 
the price of kidneys exceed their cost in this empirical model?  The answer to this 
question will not be fully answered until an open market is implemented and tested in the 
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real world.  However, specific policy procedures and constraints would be needed to 
prevent a large increase in price.  If the price of kidneys became too high the ethical 
concerns for the poor described in the previous section would be quite relevant, thus 
making open markets the wrong choice for policy.  Though economics is an analytical 
science, one must never forget the impact policy has on those people who are most 
vulnerable. 
In conclusion, this open minded debate on procurement policy must persist if we 
are to ever alleviate the shortage of kidneys and the large social costs that result from this 
shortage.  Policy makers must look at this issue from all angles and determine how best 
to fix the problem.  Though open market operations may not be the most popular solution 
to the kidney shortage, it must be considered and pondered when approaching the 
daunting task of alleviating the kidney shortage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References 
Adams, F. I., Barnett, A. H., & Kaserman, D. L. (1999). Markets for Organs:  The 
Question of Supply. Contemporary Economic Policy, 17(2), 147-155.  
28
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 2 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol2/iss1/3
Free Kidney For Sale? 30 
Altinanahtar, Alper, B.A., M.A. (May 2004). Efficient Allocation of Resources in Human 
Organ Markets: Is it Achievable Through Economic Tools? (Dissertation in 
Economics to Partially Fulfill Requirements for a Doctor of Philosophy ed.). UMI 
Dissertation Services: Texas Tech University Graduate School. 
Annas, G. J. (June 1988). The Paradoxes of Organ Transplant. American Journal of 
Public Health, 78(6), 621-622.  
Barney, D. L., & Reynolds, L. R. (1989). An Economic Analysis of Transplant Organs. 
Atlantic Economic Journal, 17(3), 12-20.  
Blair, R. D., & Kaserman, D. L. (1991). The Economics and Ethics of Alternative 
Cadaveric Organ Procurement Policies. Yale Journal on Regulation, 8, 403-452.  
Bryant, E. (2005). Kidney Failure, Dialysis, and Transplantation. Retrieved 
February/Tuesday, 2005 from http://www.nfb.org/vodold/kidney.htm  
Caplan, A. L., & Welvang, P. (February 1989). Are required request laws working?  
Altruism and the procurement of organs and tissues. Clinical Transplantation, 3, 
170-176.  
Eggers, P. (1992). Comparison of Treatment Cost between Dialysis and Transplantation. 
Seminars in Nephrology, 12(3), 284-289.  
Frank, R. H. (2003). Microeconomics and Behavior (Fifth Edition ed.). New York, NY: 
McGraw-Hill Companies Inc. 
29
Allen: Free Kidney For Sale? Substitution, the Shortage, and Procurement
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2006
Free Kidney For Sale? 31 
Henderson, J. W. (2002). In Calhoun J. W., et al (Eds.), Health Economics and Policy 
(2nd ed.). Ohio: South-Western. 
OPTN. (2005). Organ Procurement and Transplant Network. Retrieved March/7, 2005 
from http://www.optn.org  
Phillips, M. (2003). Presumed Consent for Organ Donation is Unethical. (pp. 82-86). 
Farmington Hills, MI: Greenhaven Press & Thomson Gale.  
Scheper-Hughes, N. (2005, Organs without Borders. Foreign Policy, (January/February) 
26-27.  
Siminoff, Laura A., PhD, Arnold, Robert M., MD, Caplan, Arthur L., PhD, Virnig, Beth 
A., PhD, & Seltzer, Deborah L., BA. (July 1995). Public Policy Governing Organ 
and Tissue Procurement in the United States. American College of Physicians, 
123(1), 10-17.  
UNOS. (2005). United Network of Organ Sharing. Retrieved March 30, 2005 from 
www.unos.org  
USRDS. (2005). United States Renal Data System. Retrieved March, 2005 from 
http://www.usrds.org/  
Virnig, B. A., & Caplan, A. L. (October 1992). Required Request: What Difference Has 
It Made? Transplantation Proceedings, 24(5), 2155-2158.  
 
30
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 2 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol2/iss1/3
